Standards List

System Structure and Parameterization (SSP) is a tool independent standard to define complete systems consisting of one or more FMUs (see Functional-Mockup-Interface) including its parameterization that can be transferred between simulation tools.

Per SAE J3016 (2021), the Operational Design Domain (ODD) for a driving automation system is defined as “Operating conditions under which a given driving automation system, or feature thereof, is specifically designed to function, including, but not limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or absence of certain traffic or roadway characteristics.”; in short the ODD defines the limits within which the driving automation system is designed to operate, and as such, will only operate when the parameters described within the ODD are satisfied.. This information Report serves to provide terminology, definitions and taxonomy for use in describing an ODD and respective elements for a driving automation system. This classification and definition of a harmonized set of ODD elements is based on the collection and analysis of existing information from multiple sources. This information report provides guidance for defining the ODD applicable to a driving automation system, where the ODD scope is dependent on the driving automation system Level (1-5), as defined in SAE J3016. While this Information Report provides definitions to be understood by a human, the terminology and language as used in the individual developer’s specification may vary dependent on the system design (hardware, software, perception, etc.)

This SAE Information Report classifies and defines a harmonized set of safety principles intended to be considered by ADS and ADS-equipped vehicle development stakeholders. The set of safety principles herein is based on the collection and analysis of existing information from multiple entities, reflecting the content and spirit of their efforts, including:
SAE ITC AVSC Best Practices
CAMP Automated Vehicle Research for Enhanced Safety - Final Report
RAND Report - Measuring Automated Vehicle Safety: Forging a Framework
U.S. DOT: Automated Driving Systems 2.0 - A Vision for Safety
Safety First for Automated Driving (SaFAD)
UNECE WP29 amendment proposal
UNECE/TRANS/WP.29/GRVA/2019/13
On a Formal Model of Safe and Scalable Self-Driving Cars (Intel RSS model)
SAE J3018
This SAE Information Report provides guidance for the consideration and application of the safety principles for the development and deployment of ADS and ADS-equipped vehicles. This SAE Information Report is not intended to encompass all aspects of system-level safety for an ADS-equipped vehicle, including communication with other traffic participants. Addressing all identified safety principles is intended to support, but not fully ensure, comprehensive system-level safety.
As an SAE Information Report, this document is non-normative, imposes no requirements, and does not address:
Requirements for methodology, metrics, and/or acceptance thresholds.
Ethics-related safety principles, or any link between the safety principles defined in this document and ethical studies/frameworks.
Conformance with safety principles for purposes of liability and/or fault assignment.
As ADS technology and deployment are expanded in the future, this document may be reconsidered for future revision including normative requirements.

This document describes machine-to-machine (M2M) communication to enable cooperation between two or more participating entities or communication devices possessed or controlled by those entities. The cooperation supports or enables performance of the dynamic driving task (DDT) for a subject vehicle with driving automation feature(s) engaged. Other participants may include other vehicles with driving automation feature(s) engaged, shared road users (e.g., drivers of manually operated vehicles or pedestrians or cyclists carrying personal devices), or road operators (e.g., those who maintain or operate traffic signals or workzones).
Cooperative driving automation (CDA) aims to improve the safety and flow of traffic and/or facilitate road operations by supporting the movement of multiple vehicles in proximity to one another. This is accomplished, for example, by sharing information that can be used to influence (directly or indirectly) DDT performance by one or more nearby road users. Vehicles and infrastructure elements engaged in cooperative automation may share information, such as state (e.g., vehicle position, signal phase), intent (e.g., planned vehicle trajectory, signal timing), or seek agreement on a plan (e.g., coordinated merge). Cooperation among multiple participants and perspectives in traffic can improve safety, mobility, situational awareness, and operations. However, nothing in this document is intended to suggest that driving automation requires such cooperation in order to be performed safely.
Cooperative strategies may be enabled by the sharing of information in a way that meets the needs of a given application. The needs may be expressed in terms of performance characteristics, such as latency, transmission mode (e.g., one-way, two-way), range, privacy and security, and information content and quality. There are several potential technologies for communicating information between the subject vehicle and other participants.
This document focuses on application-oriented functionality and does not imply the need for or require any specific functionality associated with communications protocols or the open systems interconnection model layers in a protocol stack. This document addresses the operational and tactical timescales of dynamic driving on ADS-operated vehicles, and excludes strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints. This information report is intended to facilitate communication and awareness for the design and anticipated development and validation of cooperative driving automation.

This document describes [motor] vehicle driving automation systems that perform part or all of the dynamic driving task (DDT) on a sustained basis. It provides a taxonomy with detailed definitions for six levels of driving automation, ranging from no driving automation (Level 0) to full driving automation (Level 5), in the context of [motor] vehicles (hereafter also referred to as 'vehicle' or 'vehicles') and their operation on roadways:
Level 0:
No Driving Automation
Level 1:
Driver Assistance
Level 2:
Partial Driving Automation
Level 3:
Conditional Driving Automation
Level 4:
High Driving Automation
Level 5:
Full Driving Automation
These level definitions, along with additional supporting terms and definitions provided herein, can be used to describe the full range of driving automation features equipped on [motor] vehicles in a functionally consistent and coherent manner. 'On-road' refers to publicly accessible roadways (including parking areas and private campuses that permit public access) that collectively serve all road users, including cyclists, pedestrians, and users of vehicles with and without driving automation features.
The levels apply to the driving automation feature(s) that are engaged in any given instance of on-road operation of an equipped vehicle. As such, although a given vehicle may be equipped with a driving automation system that is capable of delivering multiple driving automation features that perform at different levels, the level of driving automation exhibited in any given instance is determined by the feature(s) that are engaged.
This document also refers to three primary actors in driving: the (human) user, the driving automation system, and other vehicle systems and components. These other vehicle systems and components (or the vehicle in general terms) do not include the driving automation system in this model, even though as a practical matter a driving automation system may actually share hardware and software components with other vehicle systems, such as a processing module(s) or operating code.
The levels of driving automation are defined by reference to the specific role played by each of the three primary actors in performance of the DDT and/or DDT fallback. “Role” in this context refers to the expected role of a given primary actor, based on the design of the driving automation system in question and not necessarily to the actual performance of a given primary actor. For example, a driver who fails to monitor the roadway during engagement of a Level 1 adaptive cruise control (ACC) system still has the role of driver, even while s/he is neglecting it.
Active safety systems, such as electronic stability control (ESC) and automatic emergency braking (AEB), and certain types of driver assistance systems, such as lane keeping assistance (LKA), are excluded from the scope of this driving automation taxonomy because they do not perform part or all of the DDT on a sustained basis, but rather provide momentary intervention during potentially hazardous situations. Due to the momentary nature of the actions of active safety systems, their intervention does not change or eliminate the role of the driver in performing part or all of the DDT, and thus are not considered to be driving automation, even though they perform automated functions. In addition, systems that inform, alert, or warn the driver about hazards in the driving environment are also outside the scope of this driving automation taxonomy, as they neither automate part or all of the DDT, nor change the driver’s role in performance of the DDT (see 8.13).
It should be noted, however, that crash avoidance features, including intervention-type active safety systems, may be included in vehicles equipped with driving automation systems at any level. For automated driving system (ADS) features (i.e., Levels 3 to 5) that perform the complete DDT, crash mitigation and avoidance capability is part of ADS functionality (see also 8.13).

This document is a list with definitions of terms and taxonomies related to ADS V&V.

This bilingual DIN SAE SPEC (German/English) defines terms used in automated vehicle technology, particularly terms relating to simulations and test environments. This document will be a useful tool for further research and development activities in this area, and for better communication with international partners. It will help unify language in this complex, interdisciplinary field.
This DIN SAE SPEC does not define terms on levels of automation or vehicle parameters.
This DIN SAE SPEC (PAS) is intended for R&D personnel, software developers, test track operators, testing organizations and manufacturers of automated vehicles.

This PAS sets out the fundamental principles for the provision and maintenance of cyber security in relation to reducing threat and harm to products, services and systems within increasingly connected and collaborative intelligent transport eco-systems. The concept of an automotive ecosystem encompasses:
• the vehicles;
• related infrastructure, including road-side and remote systems that provide services to the vehicles, their operators, occupants and cargo; and
• the human elements, including vehicle owners and/or operators, designers, manufacturers and service providers.
This PAS is applicable to the security and functional safety aspects of the entire automotive development and use life cycle, including specification, design, implementation, integration, verification, validation, configuration, production, operation, servicing and decommissioning. A lifecycle approach is required to address the risks arising from the constantly changing threat landscape, so as to protect vehicles and vehiclerelated systems once they have been delivered to the market.
This PAS is intended for use by vehicle manufacturers, Tier-1 and Tier-2 supply chain suppliers, authorized service centres, aftermarket suppliers, road/highways authorities and service providers both to the vehicle and to its occupants and/or cargo. It can also be informative for other stakeholders of the automotive supply chain and the operators of automotive vehicles.
The PAS is intended to apply to new or modified products, systems and services and its adoption does not require vehicle manufacturers, suppliers or service providers to apply its provisions retroactively.

This document describes the triggering conditions for adverse weather conditions for the following three use cases:
• adverse weather conditions - fog
• adverse weather conditions - precipitation
• adverse weather conditions - traction loss

This document describes the triggering conditions for dangerous situations detected by an intervention of active safety systems for the following three vehicle C-ITS services:
• dangerous situations – electronic emergency brake light
• dangerous situations – automatic brake intervention
• dangerous situations – occupant restraint system intervention